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Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 101 S. Ct.
1200 (1981).
The United States Supreme Court recently considered the constitu-
tionality of a gender-based statutory rape law. In Michael M. v. Superior
Court of Sonoma County,I the Court held, in a split decision,2 that Califor-
nia's statutory rape law3 does not violate the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment 4 even though it subjects only males to crimi-
nal liability.
In deciding Michael M., the Supreme Court participated in a denial
of fourteenth amendment rights and opened the way for future circum-
vention of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
This Note critically examines the opinions filed by the Supreme Court
in Michael M. and suggests an alternative resolution for the issue of
whether gender-based statutory rape laws are consistent with the de-
mands of the equal protection clause.
I. FACTS AND CASE HISTORY
On the evening of June 3, 1978, Sharon, a 161/2-year-old female,
and her 21-year-old sister purchased a half pint of whiskey and began
drinking. At approximately midnight, Sharon and her sister were wait-
1 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981).
2 Five justices concluded that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court in an
opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Powell joined. Justice Stew-
art also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment. Justice Brennan wrote a dissent which was joined by Justices White and Marshall. A
separate dissenting opinion was filed by Justice Stevens.
3 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1981) states that "[u]nlawful sexual intercourse
is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator,
where the female is under the age of 18 years."
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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ing at a bus stop when they were approached by Michael, age 17 , and
two other male youths who offered the girls some wine. The five youths
drank together and walked to nearby railroad tracks.5
At the railroad tracks, Sharon and Michael moved away from the
others, went into the bushes, laid down together, and kissed and hugged.
After about thirty minutes, Sharon's sister approached them and asked
Sharon if she was ready to go home. Sharon declined the invitation to
leave, so her sister left with one of the other boys. At this time, Sharon
began kissing the third boy until he left by himself a few minutes later.
After the others had departed, Sharon and Michael walked to a park.6
At the park, Sharon and Michael lay down on a bench and re-
sumed kissing and hugging. Michael told Sharon to remove her pants,
but she refused. After Michael struck her with his fist, Sharon then said
to herself, "[f]orget it," and offered no further resistance to Michael's
advances. He removed her pants, and the couple had intercourse. 7
Michael was charged by information with a felony violation of sec-
tion 261.5 of the California Penal Code which makes an act of sexual
intercourse unlawful if accomplished with a female under the age of
eighteen. 8 He sought to set aside the information on both federal and
state constitutional grounds, claiming that the California statute unlaw-
fully discriminated against males. Both the trial court and the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals rejected his arguments. 9 Michael then sought a
writ of prohibition from the California Supreme Court to compel the
trial court "to dismiss the information on the ground that section 261.5
violates the equal protection clauses of both the United States and Cali-
fornia Constitutions, because only females are protected by the statute
and only males may be prosecuted under it."1
The Supreme Court of California denied Michael's petition for a
writ of prohibition in a 4 to 3 decision. I' Justice Richardson, writing for
the majority, acknowledged that the statute discriminates on the basis of
sex.' 2 He then applied a standard of strict scrutiny to the statute, pur-
portedly requiring the state to demonstrate both a compelling interest to
5 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 25 Cal. 3d 608,615-16,601 P.2d 572,
577, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340, 345 (1979) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
6 Id.
7 Id. See also 101 S. Ct. at 1212-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (partial text of Sharon's
preliminary hearing tdstimony).
8 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 25 Cal. 3d at 610, 601 P. 2d at 574,
159 Cal. Rptr. at 342. See note 3 .upra.
9 See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 101 S. Ct. at 1203.
10 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 25 Cal. 3d at 610, 601 P. 2d at 574,
159 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
11 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 601 P.2d 572, 159
Cal. Rptr. 340.
12 Id. at 611, 601 P.2d at 574, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
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justify the law and the necessity of the gender-based classification to
achieve the statute's purpose.13 According to the majority, the state es-
tablished a compelling interest in preventing pregnancies among unwed
teenage girls. 14 Justice Richardson stated that the "[1]egislature is well
within its power in imposing criminal sanctions against males, alone,
because they are the on4, persons who may physiologically cause the re-
sult which the law properly seeks to avoid."1 5
In challenging the statute, Michael argued that the statute is (1)
overbroad because it includes those who practice birth control or are
incapable of procreation and (2) underinclusive because it does not hold
females equally culpable with males.16 The majority of the California
Court rejected both of these contentions as well as Michael's assertion
that the statute reflects negatively upon the capacity of minor females to
make intelligent decisions concerning sexual relations. Accordingly, the
majority concluded that the constitutional mandate of equal protection
of the laws does not require the adoption of a gender-neutral statutory
13 Id. at 610-11, 601 P.2d at 574, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342 (citing Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5
Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971)). See Comment, The Constitutionality oftalu-
tog Rape Laws, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 757, 784-87 (1980) for the view that the California
Supreme Court failed to apply the standard of strict scrutiny properly in Michael M.
14 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 25 Cal. 3d at 612, 601 P.2d at 575,
159 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
15 Id. at 612, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (emphasis in original).
16 Statutes challenged under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment are
subject to a three-step inquiry. The first step is to identify the purpose of the challenged law.
The second step is to examine the relationship between the statutory classification and the
statutory purpose. The third step is to determine whether the statutory classification is under-
inclusive or overinclusive, or both, in relation to the achievement of the statutory purpose. P.
POLYVIOu, THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 57 (1980).
In discussing this approach to equal protection, Polyviou notes that courts often do not
distinguish between the second and third steps. Courts generally incorporate these two steps
into a single inquiry of whether the statutory classification "can be justified in terms of the
achievement of the State's permissible objectives." Id. Yet, Polyviou cites Rinaldi v. Yeager,
384 U.S. 305 (1966), in making a distinction between the requirement of "rationality in the
nature of the class singled out" and the "requirement of an adequate relationship between
trait and objective." P. PoLYvIou, supra at 57. He concluded that the "[c]omposition as well
as nexus must therefore be rational." Id.
If a court finds a statute to be overbroad because it includes individuals in its classifica-
tion which are not "tainted with the mischief at which the law apparently aims," the court
will require the state to justify the overinclusion. Id. at 78. Overinclusion will be allowed in
only exceptional cases such as emergency situations where there is a threat to national secur-
ity. Id. at 78-80 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
An underinclusive statute is one which leaves out individuals who are similar, with re-
gard to the purpose of the statute, to those individuals who are included within the statutory
classification. Courts will generally not tolerate underinclusiveness unless the state can show
that differences actually do exist between the statutory class and those left out or that admin-
istrative factors justify the underinclusion. P. POLYVIOU, supra at 71-78.
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rape law.17
Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court filed a vigorous dis-
sent. Pointing out that the Attorney General and the majority both
failed to offer any support for their contention that the purpose of the
statute is the prevention of teenage pregnancies, Justice Mosk offered his
own analysis of the history behind the California statutory rape law.18
He found that the statutory rape laws were originally meant "to pro-
hibit sexual intercourse with the underage female because she was be-
lieved to be 'too young to understand the nature and quality of her act'
. . . and hence incapable of intelligently consenting thereto."19 More-
over, he found no support in either the legislative history or earlier court
interpretations for the argument that prevention of teenage pregnancy
was the purpose of the statute. Justice Mosk concluded that the true
purpose behind the statute was the protection of the virtue of underage
females who are presumed to be incapable of giving informed consent to
sexual intercourse. 20 He was troubled to find that the statute reflects
and perpetuates the sexual stereotypes of underage females being inca-
pable of making informed decisions regarding sexual relations and being
less responsible for their actions than their male counterparts. 21
Justice Mosk expressed additional disagreement with the majority
by finding that the statute would still be unconstitutional even if preg-
nancy prevention was the actual purpose of the statute. He reasoned
that, since both the male and female are equally responsible if a preg-
nancy results, they should be treated equally. The state has no compel-
ling reason for excusing only the female from criminal responsibility.
Hence, he determined that the law was impermissibly underinclusive. 22
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to con-
sider the constitutionality of California's statutory rape law under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.23
II. SUPREME COURT DECISION
There was no majority opinion for the Court. Justice Rehnquist
announced the judgment of the Court, and Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart and Powell joined in his opinion. Justice Stewart also
17 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 25 Cal. 3d at 614, 601 P.2d at 576,
159 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
18 Id. at 617-21, 601 P.2d at 578-80, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 346-48 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 617, 601 P.2d at 578, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 346 (citing Myers, Reasonable Mistake ofAge:
A Needed Defense to Statutogi Rape, 64 MICH. L. REv. 105, 110 (1965)).
20 Id. at 618, 601 P.2d at 578-79, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 346-47.
21 Id. at 624-25, 601 P.2d at 582-83, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 350-51 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 621, 601 P.2d at 580, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 348 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See also note 16
supra on the impermissibility of underinclusive classifications.
23 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980).
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filed a concurring opinion. Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concur-
ring in the judgment. Justices White and Marshall joined in the dissent-
ing opinion of Justice Brennan. Justice Stevens filed a separate
dissenting opinion.
In the plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist set out the appropriate
standard for judicial review of gender-based statutory classifications.
The California statute treats males and females under the age of eight-
een differently and thereby establishes a gender-based classification.
Relying upon Stanton v. Stanton,24 Craig v. Boren ,25 and Reed v. Reed,26 Jus-
tice Rehnquist explained that a gender-based statutory classification
will survive an equal protection challenge if it bears a substantial rela-
tionship to an important state objective. 27 Under this intermediate level
of scrutiny, gender-based classifications which realistically reflect "the
fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances" 28
will survive the Court's scrutiny.
In examining California's purpose for its statutory rape law, Justice
Rehnquist prefaced his findings by noting that individual legislators
most likely voted for the statute for a variety of reasons and that the
actual purpose of the statute was "likely to be elusive."' 29 Justice Rehn-
quist then accepted the State's assertion and the California Supreme
Court's conclusion that the prevention of illegitimate teenage
pregnancies was one of the purposes of the statute. Finding this to be a
permissible purpose for the statute, Justice Rehnquist declined to con-
sider the allegation that the actual legislative purpose of the statute was,
impermissibly, "to protect the virtue and chastity of young women. ' '3°
Applying the intermediate level of scrutiny, Justice Rehnquist
found that the California gender-based classification does not violate the
equal protection clause since the classification bears a substantial rela-
tionship to the achievement of an important state interest. In reaching
24 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (Utah child support statute setting age of majority at 21 for males
and at 18 for females violated the equal protection clause because the classifications were not
adequately related to the statutory objective).
25 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under
21 and to females under 18 violated the equal protection clause because the classifications
were not substantially related to the asserted purpose of enhancing traffic safety).
26 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (Idaho statute giving a preference to a man over a woman for ap-
pointment as an administrator of a decedent's estate when both persons were of the same
entitlement class violated the equal protection clause because the state's interest in adminis-
trative convenience could not justify such discriminatory treatment).
27 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 101 S. Ct. at 1204. This intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny is less demanding than the strict scrutiny standard applied by the
Supreme Court of California. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
28 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 101 S. Ct. at 1204.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1205-06 n.7.
1378 [Vol. 72
STATUTORY RAPE
his decision, Justice Rehnquist initially recognized that the prevention
of teenage pregnancies is a matter in which the State has an important
interest.31 Moreover, he found that the punishment of males who en-
gage in sexual intercourse with females under the age of eighteen years is
substantially related to achieving the State's objective of preventing
teenage pregnancies. 32 According to Justice Rehnquist, the exclusion of
minor females, but not minor males, from such punishment is reason-
able because the criminal sanction imposed only upon the males "serves
to roughly 'equalize' the deterrents on the sexes." 33 Without factual
support or a discussion of the effects of birth control on teenage sexual-
ity, Justice Rehnquist concluded that minor females are substantially
deterred from engaging in sexual intercourse by the risk of pregnancy.34
He also justified the unequal treatment of minor females and males by
accepting the State's contention that the gender-based classification en-
hances effective enforcement of the statute. The state reasoned that fe-
males would be less likely to report violations under a gender-neutral
statute for fear of being subjected to criminal prosecution. 35
Justice Rehnquist rejected the argument that the statute is over-
broad because it prohibits intercourse with prepubescent females who
are incapable of becoming pregnant. After noting that the statute could
be justified on the grounds that prepubescent females are susceptible to
injury from intercourse, Justice Rehnquist summarily rejected the over-
breadth argument as "ludicrous. '36
As a final point, Justice Rehnquist noted that the statute burdens
males and not females. Since men have not traditionally been discrimi-
nated against, Justice Rehnquist determined that males are not "in need
of the special solicitude of the courts."37 He concluded that the discrim-
ination of section 261.5 is not invidious, is not solely for administrative
convenience, and does not stem from sexual stereotypes. "[T]he statute
instead reasonably reflects the fact that the consequences of sexual inter-
course and pregnancy fall more heavily on the female than on the
male."38
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart chose a simplistic reason-
ing process to uphold the statute against the equal protection challenge.
31 Id. at 1205.
32 Id. at 1206.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1206-07.
36 Id. at 1207. With regard to prepubescent children, Justice Stewart also found that the
discrimination was justified because female children faced greater physical risks than male
children. Id. at 1210 (Stewart, J., concurring).




Of significance to Justice Stewart was the fact that section 261.5 is only
one part of California's statutory scheme to protect minors from the
dangers of adolescent sexual activity.39 Without commenting upon the
legislative purpose, Justice Stewart summarily concluded that "[y]oung
women and men are not similarly situated with respect to the problems
and risks associated with intercourse and pregnancy, and the statute is
realistically related to the legitimate state purpose of reducing those
problems and risks."4 He assumed that risk of pregnancy is a signifi-
cant deterrent for unmarried minor females but not for unmarried
males. Therefore, Justice Stewart concluded that, since males are not
situated in a position similar to minor females, the state can limit crimi-
nal punishment to males.41 While Justice Stewart acknowledged that
California might have been able to draft the statute to more precisely
achieve the objective of preventing teenage pregnancies, he found that
the gender classifications of section 261.5 are permissible. 42
Justice Blackmun voted to affirm on the basis of the intermediate
level of scrutiny which was the same test used by Justices Rehnquist and
Stewart. 43 The major portion of Justice Blackmun's opinion, however,
was devoted to what he considered to be important distinctions between
the State's power to control the sexual activities of minors and the
State's power over individuals after conception has occurred, especially
as related to abortion decisions. 44 Justice Blackmun expressed concern
over the problem of teenage pregnancies while recognizing that minors
have "substantial privacy rights in intimate affairs connected with pro-
creation. '45 Justice Blackmun would allow greater State interference
with these rights prior to conception than he would once a pregnancy
occurred. 46
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan concluded that the State
failed to show that the gender-based classification bears a substantial
39 Id. (Stewart, J. concurring). Also included in California's statutory scheme are CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 272, 647(a) (West Supp. 1981) which prohibit any person of either sex from
molesting, annoying, or contributing to the delinquency of anyone under eighteen years of
age, and CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (West Supp. 1981) which prohibits all persons from com-
mitting "any lewd or lascivious act," including sexual intercourse, with a minor under four-
teen years of age.
40 101 S. Ct. at 1209 (Stewart, J., concurring). Apparently, Justice Stewart's realistic rela-
tion is similar to the equalizer argument ofJustice Rehnquist. See note 33 and accompanying
text supra.
41 Id. at 1210.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
44 Id. Justice Blackmun refers specifically to Carey v. Population Services International,
431 U.S. 678 (1977) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).




relationship to the prevention of teenage pregnancies.47 Justice Brennan
initially noted that the State has the burden of proving both the impor-
tance of its objective and the substantiality of the relationship between
the classification and the objective. He pointed out that, in order to
meet this burden, the State must show that a gender-neutral statute
would be less effective than a gender-based law in achieving the State's
objective.48 Justice Brennan cited two flaws in the State's assertion that
a gender-neutral statute would be less effective. First, he noted that at
least thirty-seven states have gender-neutral statutory rape laws and
that California offered no evidence that any of those states faced en-
forcement or effectiveness problems. In addition, Justice Brennan re-
ferred to sodomy and oral copulation statutes in California that apply in
a gender-neutral manner and are enforced without increased diffi-
culty.49 Second, even if a gender-neutral statute were more difficult to
enforce, the State failed to show that such a statute would be less effec-
tive in deterring minor females from sexual intercourse.50 As a conse-
quence, Justice Brennan argued that the State's failure to show that "a
gender-neutral law would be a less effective deterrent than a gender-
based law, like the State's failure to prove that a gender-neutral -law
would be difficult to enforce," required the invalidation of section
261.5.51 Justice Brennan commented that the State's inability to pro-
duce evidence of a substantial relationship between the gender classifi-
cation and the prevention of teenage pregnancies was possibly due to
the fact that the gender classification of the statutory rape law stemmed
from "outmoded sexual stereotypes."'52 He concluded that section 261.5
47 Id. at 1215-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 1215. Justice Brennan relied upon the prior Supreme Court decisions in Kirch-
berg v. Feenstra, 101 S. Ct. 1195 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142
(1980); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). His formulation on what the state must show illustrates how a
state can meet its burden of proving a substantial relationship between a gender-based classi-
fication and a statutory objective. A state will not be permitted to classify on the basis of sex
if the state's purpose could be served as well by a gender-neutral classification that does not
carry with it sexual stereotypes. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 283.
49 101 S. Ct. at 1216 (Brennan, J., dissenting); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 286(b)(1), 288a(b)(1)
(West Supp. 1981).
50 101 S. Ct. at 1216.
51 Id. at 1217.
52 Id. at 1218. He'also noted that pregnancy prevention was first named as a purpose of
§ 261.5 in the California Supreme Court's decision in Michael M. despite the fact that the
statute has been in force for 130 years. Historically, § 261.5 was based on the stereotypical
premise that the chastity of young women was in need of special protection because young
women were considered legally incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse, whereas young
men were presumed to be legally capable of giving such consent. For this contention, Justice
Brennan cited the Statutes of Westminster (3 Edw. 1, ch. 13 (1275), 13 Edw. 1, ch. 34 (1285)),
the draftsmen's notes to the Penal Code of 1872 (Code Commissioners' note, subd. 1, foil. Pen.
Code 261 (lst ed. 1872, p.1 1l)), and Note, Forcible and Statutog Rape: An Explanation of the
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violates the equal protection clause and that the California Supreme
Court should be reversed.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens expressed surprise over the plurality's
belief that the risk of pregnancy is an effective deterrent to prevent mi-
nor females from engaging in sexual intercourse. He acknowledged that
minor females may need special protection in order to prevent un-
wanted and illegitimate teenage pregnancies. Yet, he argued that this
need for protection warrants making minor females subject to the stat-
ute rather than exempting them from it. 5 3 In making this argument,
Justice Stevens recognized that the State has an interest in preventing
teenage pregnancies and could effectuate this interest by prohibiting
and punishing sexual intercourse involving minor females.54 He con-
tended that both participants in "risk-creating conduct" should receive
equal treatment under the law unless one party is more guilty than the
other.55 He concluded that the imposition of criminal sanctions only
upon the male seemed to arbitrarily assume that the male is somehow
more guilty than the female for engaging in forbidden sexual activity.56
On these grounds, he dissented.
III. ANALYSIS
In recent years, a number of state and lower federal courts have
considered, with divergent outcomes, the constitutionality of gender-
based statutory rape laws.57 Hence, the Supreme Court's decision to
consider this question is not surprising. The outcome of Michael M. is
Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L. J. 55 (1952). Under the Statutes of
Westminster, the age of consent for engaging in sexual intercourse was twelve years old and
therefore the proscription on statutory rape was unrelated to pregnancy prevention. The
draftsmen's notes to the California Penal Code of 1872 did not mention pregnancy prevention
as a purpose behind the statutory rape law but rather referred to the inability of a girl under
ten years old to give consent to an act of intercourse. The Yale Law Journal Note provides a
general discussion of the historical purpose of statutory rape laws.
53 101 S. Ct. at 1219 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 1218. Justice Stevens referred to such activity as "risk-creating conduct."
55 Id. at 1220.
56 Id. at 1220-21. ("A rule that authorizes punishment of only one of two equally guilty
wrongdoers violates the essence of the constitutional requirement that the sovereign must
govern impartially.")
57 Cases in which the constitutionality of gender-based "statutory rape" laws has been
upheld: Rundlett v. Oliver, 607 F.2d 495 (lst Cir. 1979); Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232
(4th Cir. 1976); State v. Gray, 122 Ariz. 445, 595 P.2d 990 (1979); State v. Drake, 219 N.W.2d
492 (Iowa 1974); In Re Interest of J.D.G., 498 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. 1973); Olson v. State, 95 Nev.
1, 588 P.2d 1018 (1979); State v. Wilson, 296 N.C. 298, 250 S.E.2d 621 (1979); State v. El-
more, 24 Or. App. 651, 546 P.2d 1117 (1976).
Cases in which gender-based "statutory rape" laws were held to violate equal protection
include: United States v. Hicks, 625 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1980), vacated, 101 S. Ct. 1752 (1981);
Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1980); Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978).
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unfortunate, however, because it opens the way for state circumvention
of the Equal Protection Clause. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Michael M suffers from three major flaws. First, the Supreme
Court should not have accepted the pregnancy prevention rationale
without questioning it. Second, the gender-based classification cannot
bear a substantial relation to the prevention of teenage pregnancies be-
cause the statute is impermissibly overbroad. Finally, the statute also
fails to satisfy the substantial relation test since the classification is
underinclusive.
A. ACCEPTANCE OF THE PREGNANCY PREVENTION RATIONALE
The United States Supreme Court should have rejected the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's determination that the prevention of teenage
pregnancies was the purpose of section 261.5. As explained by Justice
Mosk, the true purpose behind the statute was the protection of the
chastity of minor females who were presumed to be incapable of giving
informed consent to sexual intercourse.5 8 An examination of the history
of statutory rape laws, the language of section 261.5, and prior decisions
of California courts all suggest that prevention of teenage pregnancies
was not one of the purposes of the statute.59 The California Supreme
Court's eagerness to embrace pregnancy prevention as the purpose of
section 261.5 without any evidence to support the finding suggests an
attempt to circumvent the requirements of equal protection. Certainly,
nothing in the 130-year history of the statute justified the conclusion
that pregnancy prevention was a purpose behind the statute. Rather,
determination that pregnancy prevention is the objective of section
261.5 was first made by the California Supreme Court in Michael M.
Other courts have refused to accept the assertion by government
58 25 Cal. 3d at 617-21, 601 P.2d at 578-80, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 346-48 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
59 Comment, The Constlutionality of Statuloe Rape Laws, sumpra note 13, at 786-87 ("[B]oth
the history of statutory rape laws and the language of the statute suggest that pregnancy
prevention was not among the purposes of California's statutory rape law."); Michael M. v.
Superior Court of Sonoma County, 25 Cal. 3d at 617-21, 601 P.2d at 577-80, 159 Cal. Rptr.
at 346-48 (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("[R]educing illicit pregnancies among teenage girls may well
be a laudable governmental objective, but it is wishful thinking to believe that the California
statutory rape law was actually enacted or reenacted for that purpose.'); Michael M. v. Supe-
rior Court of Sonoma County, 101 S. Ct. at 1217 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Until very re-
cently, no California court or commentator had suggested that the purpose of California's
statutory rape law was to protect young women from the risk of pregnancy. Indeed, the
historical development of § 261.5 demonstrates that the law was initially enacted on the
premise that young women, in contrast to young men, were to be deemed legally incapable of
consenting to an act of sexual intercourse.'); People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal.2d 529, 393 P.2d
673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1964) (describing the purpose of California's statutory rape law to be
the protection of young females presumed to be too innocent and naive to give informed
consent to sexual intercourse).
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attorneys that gender-based statutory rape laws were intended to pre-
vent teenage pregnancies. In Meloon v. Helgemoe,60 the First Circuit ex-
amined an asserted pregnancy prevention rationale "with special
wariness. '61 Because the ability to become pregnant is unique to wo-
men, the Meloon court was alert to the fact that "the very uniqueness of
this characteristic makes it an available hindsight catchall rationaliza-
tion for laws that were promulgated with totally different purposes in
mind. ' 62 Since the State failed to produce evidence supporting its asser-
tion that pregnancy prevention was a purpose of that particular statute,
the Meloon court refused to accept the pregnancy prevention rationale. 63
Similarly, the pregnancy prevention rationale was rejected in an-
other challenge to a statutory rape law in Navedo v. Preisser.64 In N~avedo,
the State of Iowa offered neither legislative history nor other evidence to
support its contention that a purpose of the statute was the prevention
of pregnancy. The Iowa Supreme Court, however, had determined in
an earlier case65 that the state legislature had enacted the statute for the
purpose of preventing teenage pregnancy and its attendant problems.66
Despite this earlier finding, the Navedo court concluded that pregnancy
prevention could not justify the gender-based statute. This conclusion
was based on a finding that the statute was underinclusive since it ex-
cluded a class of males, those under twenty-five, which could have inter-
course with and cause pregnancy in minor females. Accordingly, the
Navedo court found the pregnancy prevention justification implausible
and proceeded to inquire into the statute's actual purpose.67
The United States Supreme Court should have reached the same
conclusion as the Navedo court and thereby rejected the asserted purpose
for the California statutory rape statute. In light of history and prior
decisions of the California courts, the rationale of prevention of teenage
60 564 F.2d 602 (lst Cir. 1977). The statute at issue was N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632:1
subd. I(c) (1973) (repealed, superseded by § 632-A:2 (XI) (1975) which changed the age to 13)
which made it a felony for a male to have sexual intercourse with a female under the age of
15.
61 Id. at 607.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 608.
64 630 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1980). The statute at issue was IOWA CODE § 698.1 (1975)
(repealed 1978) which made it a felony for a male over 25 to have sexual intercourse with a
female under 16.
65 State v. Drake, 219 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1974).
66 630 F.2d at 640.
67 Id. (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199, 209 n.8 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 199, 209 n.8 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n. 16 (1975) for the proposition that "[a]lthough a court should accept
the purpose of a statute offered by the state or its courts, despite a lack of legislative history,




pregnancies appears to be nothing more that a "hindsight catchall ra-
tionalization" 68 that is "not plausible. '69 By accepting the pregnancy
prevention rationale without question, the United States Supreme
Court participated in this rationalization process and thus denied equal
protection to the defendant. Moreover, with its MichaelM. decision, the
Supreme Court has sent a message to state courts and legislatures that
the equal protection clause can be circumvented by asserting for gender-
based statutes a sham purpose which hinges upon physical differences
between the sexes. Presumably, as long as they are adopted by the high-
est court of the state, statutory objectives will not be questioned by the
United States Supreme Court even if they are implausible, hindsight
rationalizations that circumvent the guarantee of equal protection of the
laws. This result directly contravenes the notion of the Supreme Court
as the ultimate protector of constitutional rights. It is also contrary to
the Navedo court's conclusion, based upon four United States Supreme
Court cases, that a federal court could reject a state supreme court's
determination as to the purpose of a state law.70 Hence, the Supreme
Court should have rejected the pregnancy prevention rationale.
The Supreme Court's reluctance to inquire into the actual purpose
of the statute was not totally unreasonable. The Court will usually defer
to the highest state court on a matter considered to be a question of state
law.7 1 Furthermore, an examination of the four cases relied upon in
Navedo reveals that the Navedo court did not have unquestioned author-
ity to inquire beyond the statutory purpose adopted by the supreme
court of that state. In Craig v. Boren,72 the Supreme Court was con-
cerned with possible false, post hoc rationalizations asserted by a state as
a litigant but never adopted by that state's supreme court. In Cahfano v.
Goldfarb 73 and Weinberger v. W~iesenfeld,74 the Supreme Court was dealing
with the actual purposes behind federal statutes, not state laws. Finally,
in Caban v. Mohammed,75 the Supreme Court rejected one statutory justi-
68 Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d at 607.
69 Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d at 640.
70 See note 67 suipra.
71 Kingsley Intemat'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York,
360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959); United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 89 (1950).
72 429 U.S. at 199 n.7. ("For this appeal we find adequate the appellee's representation of
legislative purpose, leaving for another day consideration of whether the statement of the
State's Assistant Attorney General should suffice to inform this Court of the legislature's
objectives, or whether the Court must determine if the litigant simply is selecting a conve-
nient, but false, bost hoc rationalization.")
73 430 U.S. at 209 n.8 (dealing with 42 U.S.C. § 402(0(1)(D) (1970 ed. & Supp. V)).
74 420 U.S. at 648 (dealing with 42 U.S.C. § 402(g). "[T]he mere recitation of a benign,
compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the
actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.").
75 441 U.S. at 389-92. (New York statute in question allowed unwed mothers but not
unwed fathers to block adoption of the child by withholding consent. The Court rejected the
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fication, offered by a litigant in the case, which had never been adopted
by a state court. While the Navedo court's interpretation of these cases
was broad, it was consistent with their basic proposition that subsequent
rationalizations, unsupported by historical analysis, should not be ac-
cepted by courts in order to uphold otherwise unconstitutional statutes.
Therefore, in Michael M., where the pregnancy prevention rationale was
obviously a hindsight rationalization, the Supreme Court should have
rejected the asserted rationale and inquired into the actual purpose of
the statute to ensure that the constitutional guarantee of equal protec-
tion would be served.
B. OVERBREADTH AND UNDERINCLUSIVENESS
Even if the United States Supreme Court acted properly in ac-
cepting the justification of pregnancy prevention, it still should have
held the statutory rape statute to be violative of equal protection.
Under the equal protection test for gender-based statutes, a classifica-
tion based upon sex must bear a substantial relationship to an impor-
tant state interest. 76 The importance and legitimacy of the prevention
of teenage pregnancies as a state interest is not questioned.77 However,
section 261.5 creates a sex classification that is not substantially related
to the objective of preventing teenage pregnancies since the statute is
both overbroad and underinclusive. 78
The effectiveness of a statutory rape law as a means of preventing
teenage pregnancies is open to question. Members of the Court noted
that the statute appears to be an ineffective deterrent of such sexual
activity. 79 Nevertheless, California is attempting to deal with the teen-
age pregnancy problem by prohibiting intercourse rather than by focus-
proffered justification that the classification was proper because of fundamental differences
between maternal and paternal relations. The Court accepted the assertion that the purpose
of the statute was to promote the adoption of illegitimate children but found that the statute
was not substantially related to the achievement of that purpose.)
76 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
77 One commentator has suggested that states may not have a legitimate interest in
preventing or regulating private consensual intercourse by minors. Hence, statutory rape
laws may be subject to attack on substantive due process grounds as impermissibly burdening
the fundamental right of personal privacy. The commentator relied most heavily upon the
decision in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) in which the
Court held that the right of privacy in matters of procreation extends to minors. However,
the commentator concluded that such a substantive due process challenge would probably
fail since Carq also recognized that the state has greater latitude in regulating the conduct of
minors than it does with regard to adults. Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape
Laws, supra note 13, at 800-03.
78 See note 16 supra.
79 101 S. Ct. at 1216 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 101 S. Ct. at 1218 n.2 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). See alro Di Gennaro, Statutory Rape Law in Califomia: Unequal Protection of the Minor
Male, 2 CRIM. JUSTIc. J. 239, 243 (1979).
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ing its energies on encouraging the responsible use of birth control
methods. If California is serious about the prevention of teenage
pregnancies, a better approach to the problem would arguably be to
redirect its energies and funds from the prosecution of acts of consensual
intercourse to programs educating youths concerning birth control
methods and to clinics providing contraceptives and birth control
information.
Even if the California statutory rape law is effective in preventing
teenage pregnancies, section 261.5 is impermissibly overbroad.8 0 Sexual
intercourse involving pre-pubescent females, those who use effective
birth control, and those who are sterile is prohibited by the California
law. Yet, the prohibition of such activity cannot be substantially related
to the objective of preventing pregnancy because there is no threat of
pregnancy in these situations. If the prevention of teenage pregnancies
is to be accomplished through a statutory rape law prohibiting consen-
sual intercourse, the state of California should be required to exempt
from the operation of the statute acts of intercourse which cannot result
in pregnancy. If individuals engaging in consensual intercourse without
risk of pregnancy are not exempt from prosecution under the statute,
some other purpose must be used to justify the prohibitions of the statu-
tory rape law as applied to them. Finally, if pregnancy prevention is the
only purpose of the statute and if it includes within its prohibitions sex-
ual intercourse with individuals who are not yet of child-bearing age or
who are sterile or exercise birth control, the statute must fail as being
overinclusive in violation of equal protection.
Of the justices voting to uphold the statute, only Justice Rehnquist
attempted to address this question of overbreadth. He summarily re-
jected the argument by stating that "it is ludicrous to suggest" that
equal protection requires the exclusion of pre-pubescent females from
the scope of a statutory rape law.8 Indeed, such a suggestion is ludi-
crous. However, the suggestion is inane only because it cuts so sharply
against the historical purpose of statutory rape laws, the protection of
the virtue of young females who are presumed incapable of consent.8 2
Use of this historical purpose would defeat the overbreadth challenge
raised above. Yet, protecting only minor females on the basis of such an
asserted state interest would be constitutionally impermissible. The pre-
sumption that young females are incapable of consent while young
males are capable of giving such consent is a stereotype that state laws
are forbidden from perpetuating.83
80 See note 16 supra.
81 101 S. Ct. at 1207.
82 See Di Gennaro, note 79 supra. See also Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape, note 52 supra.
83 See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 283. ("Legislative classifications which distribute benefits
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A second possible justification for applying the statutory rape law
to sexual intercourse with pre-pubescent females would be that young
females are in special need of protection from physical and psychologi-
cal injuries resulting from consensual sexual intercourse. 84 If protection
from physical or psychological injury is the purpose for including pre-
pubescent females within the scope of the statute, the State would have
to show that pre-pubescent females are not similarly situated with re-
gard to the possibility of such injury as are males of the same age.8 5
Clearly, in Michael M., no such showing was made. As a consequence,
the gender-based prohibitions of California's statutory rape law cannot
be justified by the assertion of a secondary purpose such as the protec-
tion of young females from injury or the presumption of incapability of
consent. The validity of the statute's prohibitions must therefore de-
pend upon the substantiality of the relationship between the statutory
classifications and the objective of teenage pregnancy prevention.
California's pregnancy prevention rationale does not justify the ap-
plication of the statute to acts of intercourse involving those who exer-
cise effective means of birth control or who are sterile or too young to
bear children. Since these individuals do not create a risk of pregnancy
by engaging in sexual intercourse, the prohibition on their sexual activ-
ity adds further support to the argument that the true purpose of the
statute was the protection of the chastity of young females presumed
incapable of giving consent, rather than the prevention of teenage
pregnancies. The prohibition on sexual intercourse involving individu-
als who create no risk of pregnancy is not substantially related to preg-
nancy prevention. Therefore, the gender-based statute must fail for
overbreadth under the intermediate level of equal protection scrutiny.
The California statute is also constitutionally defective because it is
underinclusive. 86 The petitioner in Michael M. argued that, in order to
pass judicial scrutiny the statute must be made gender-neutral by hold-
ing the females as criminally liable as the males.87 Justice Rehnquist
rejected this argument of underinclusiveness by finding that the gender-
based distinction was justified because criminal sanctions imposed only
upon males served to equalize the deterrents on the sexes and aided the
and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the
'proper place' of women and their need for special protection.") The Orr Court added that a
state cannot be allowed to classify on the basis of sex where the state's purpose could be served
as well by a gender-neutral classification as by a gender-based classification which carries
with it sexual stereotypes.
84 Di Gennaro, note 79 supra.
85 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 200-04.
86 See note 16 supra.
87 101 S. Ct. at 1206.
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state in the effective enforcement of the statute."" Yet neither of these
arguments justifies California's unequal treatment of males and females.
The position that the gender-based statute is justified because it
serves to equalize the deterrents for engaging in sexual intercourse as
between males and females is untenable. First, neither Justice Rehn-
quist nor Justice Stewart cited any authority for the proposition that
females are deterred from engaging in sexual intercourse more often
than males by the risk of pregnancy. To the contrary, Justice Stevens
concluded that the risk of pregnancy is not an effective deterrent to fe-
males engaging in sexual intercourse.8 9 Even if females are more often
deterred because of possible pregnancy, these natural sanctions do not
justify unequal treatment under the laws.9° The equal protection clause
guarantees that individuals will receive equal treatment under the laws.
Unequal treatment by nature does not justify unequal treatment by the
state.9 '
The argument that the gender-based classification is substantially
related to effective enforcement of the law also fails, since the state did
not show that a gender-neutral statute would be a less effective means of
enforcing the law and thereby of preventing teenage pregnancies. 92 Jus-
tice Brennan set forth evidence that would indicate that effective en-
forcement and deterrence are possible under a gender-neutral statutory
rape law. He cited the existence of gender-neutral laws in at least thirty-
seven states and gender-neutral sodomy and oral copulation statutes in
California. 93 He even asserted that a gender-neutral statute could serve
as a greater deterrent to the conduct which the state was seeking to pre-
vent. 94 Since effective enforcement and deterrence could be achieved
through a gender-neutral law as well as the present California scheme,
the gender-based classification is not substantially related to the achieve-
ment of the state's asserted purpose.95 The State's failure to meet its
88 Id. Justice Stewart also accepted the equalizer theory as a basis for upholding the law.
See a/so text accompanying note 33 supra.
89 Id. at 1219 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 1219-20. ("But from the standpoint of fashioning a general preventive rule-or,
indeed, in determining appropriate punishment when neither party in fact has suffered any
special harm-I regard a total exemption for the members of the more endangered class as
utterly irrational. In my opinion, the only acceptable justification for a general rule requiring
disparate treatment of the two participants in a joint act must be a legislative judgment that
one is more guilty than the other.")
91 The fourteenth amendment guarantees "equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § I. See also note 90 supra.
92 See Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142; Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 281,
283. See note 49 supra.
93 101 S. Ct. at 1216 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 1216-17. (A gender-neutral statute would arguably serve as a greater deterrent
since it would have "a deterrent effect on twice as many potential violators.")
95 See note 48 & accompanying text supra.
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burden of establishing a substantial relation between pregnancy preven-
tion and the sex classification of the statute should have resulted in the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of the statute based upon underin-
clusiveness as well as overbreadth.
C. EQUAL PROTECTION AND STATUTORY RAPE LAWS AFTER
MICHAEL M.
The decision in Michael M. is unfortunate because it opens the door
for states to justify gender-based statutes with "hindsight catchall ratio-
nalizations.196 In the interest of equal protection, states should not be
given free rein to develop sham purposes for their gender-based legisla-
tion. This freedom would allow the states to rely on the possibility of
pregnancy as proof that males and females are not similarly situated for
purposes of justifying other gender-based statutes.
Michael M. is also disturbing since it perpetuates the stereotype of
the female as less knowledgeable than the male, incapable of giving in-
formed consent to sexual intercourse, and therefore less responsible for
her actions with regard to sexual activities than her male counterpart. 97
At the same time, it preserves the stereotype of the male as an aggressor
from whom the female must be protected even in consensual relations.
In discussing the case, Justice Rehnquist relies on such stereotypes when
he refers to the legislature's purpose of protecting minor females. 98 His
rejection of the overbreadth argument as "ludicrous" also suggests that
he subconsciously views the purpose of the statutory rape law to be the
protection of young females regardless of their capacity to become
pregnant. 99
The time has come to recognize that statutory rape laws can legiti-
mately be based only upon a state interest in protecting minors, both
male and female, from the physical and psychological injuries that can
result from engaging in sexual intercourse. Personal privacy rights de-
mand that sexual intercourse be prohibited only for those who are inca-
pable of giving informed consent. Hence, the age of eighteen set by
California seems too high in light of the understanding of today's youth.
Once an age of consent is determined by a legislature, statutory rape
laws should apply equally to males and females below that age unless
the state can prove that the sexes are not similarly situated with regard
to the risk of injuries, both physical and psychological, that can result
from engaging in sexual intercourse. Some have suggested that the pre-
96 Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d at 607. See notes 61-63 & accompanying text supra.
97 See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 25 Cal. 3d at 624-25, 601 P.2d at
582-83, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 350-51 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
98 101 S. Ct. at 1206.
99 Id. at 1207.
1390 [Vol. 72
STATUTORY RAPE
sumption of incapacity to consent under a certain age should be rebut-
table. 100 While this approach would afford greater due process to a
defendant and protect the privacy rights of minors, it would create proof
problems and significant uncertainty. A gender-neutral statute with a
conclusive presumption of incapacity coinciding approximately with the
onset on puberty would be a good alternative since it would reflect the
probable average age at which minors could give informed consent
without substantially burdening privacy rights.' 0 ' To afford additional
protection, a rebuttable presumption of incapacity to consent could be
established for minors between the age of puberty and age sixteen or
eighteen. 102
The punishment for violation of such statutory rape laws should
fall only upon the adult partner. Minors who are incapable of consent
should not be subjected to criminal sanctions by these statutes since the
laws are designed to protect the minors from the harmful consequences
of acts for which they are presumed not responsible because of their
youth. Therefore, in Michael M., the seventeen-year-old petitioner
should have been afforded the same protections as the sixteen-year-old
"victim."
IV. CONCLUSION
Michael M. was wrongly decided by both the California Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court. Although the State failed
to prove that teenage pregnancy prevention was the purpose of the stat-
ute, the Courts accepted this rationale as the statutory objective. By
allowing California to maintain a gender-based statute without an in-
quiry into its actual purpose, the Supreme Court participated in a de-
nial of equal protection of the laws. Legislatures and courts need to
recognize that the historical purpose of statutory rape laws was to pro-
tect those who are incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse. While
only females were protected in the past, many states have now realized
the need for protecting both young males and young females from the
possible adverse consequences of engaging in acts to which the youths
are incapable of giving informed consent. As a consequence, these states
have enacted gender-neutral statutory rape laws. 103
Moreover, the gender-based classification of section 261.5 is not
substantially related to the purported purpose of preventing teenage
pregnancies. The statute is impermissibly overbroad and defectively
100 Note, Forcible and Statutoq Rape, supra note 52, at 78; Comment, The Constitutionalip of
Statutoq Rape Laws, supra note 13 at 813.
101 Comment, The Constifutionali of Satlutoy Rape Laws, supra note 13, at 813.
102 Id.
103 101 S. Ct. at 1216 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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underinclusive. As suggested above, the state could use more effective
means for preventing teenage pregnancies which would not infringe
upon privacy interests and would not violate equal protection. With
regard to statutory rape laws, these should be gender-neutral and tai-
lored to achieve their true purpose of protecting those who are incapable
of giving informed consent to sexual intercourse. In this manner, states
can effectuate their important interests without perpetuating sexual ste-
reotypes and without infringing upon the fourteenth amendment guar-
antee of equal protection.
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